Energy model, boundary object and societal lens: 35 years of the MARKAL model in the UK by Taylor, PG et al.
1 
 
Energy Model, Boundary Object and Societal Lens: 35 years of the 
MARKAL model in the UK  
 
Peter G. Taylor1,2,3,*, Paul Upham
1,2,3,4, Will McDowall5 , David Christopherson1,2 
 
1. Centre for Integrated Energy Research, University of Leeds, Leeds, LS2 9JT, UK.  
2. Energy Research Institute, School of Chemical and Process Engineering, University of Leeds, Leeds, 
LS2 9JT, UK. 
3. Sustainability Research Institute, School of Earth and Environment, University of Leeds, Leeds, LS2 
9JT, UK. 
4. Finnish Environment Institute, Helsinki, Mechelininkatu 34a, P.O. Box 140, FI-00251 Helsinki, 
Finland. 
5. UCL Energy Institute, 14 Upper Woburn Place, London WC1H 0NN, UK 
*corresponding author - email: p.g.taylor@leeds.ac.uk, tel: +44 113 343 7169. 
 
Abstract 
Technical energy models operate within social systems and those that perform particular social as 
well as technical functions are more likely to be used. We illustrate this with the example of the 
MARKAL energy system model in the UK, a model that is also widely used internationally. In the UK, 
MARKAL modelling has a long history helping underpin government energy and climate policy. We 
trace the use of the model from its initial development in the mid-1970s to the present day, 
highlighting attributes that contribute to its role as a successful ‘boundary object’ for different but 
interconnecting energy policy communities. We suggest that changing images of the energy policy 
problem have enabled MARKAL to shift from an initial role in identifying technologies to reduce oil 
dependency to playing a key role in target-oriented climate policy. Furthermore, we argue that the 
ability of MARKAL to perform different roles for different groups has served to embed and 
institutionalise the model in the energy policy community. Moreover, the capacity of the model to 
represent detailed technology options has accorded with a technological focus that has suited 
prevailing, shared conceptions of the energy-climate policy problem.  
 
Highlights 
The MARKAL energy model has had significant influence on UK energy policy in recent years 
MARKAL’s influence derives from three inter-related factors: 
(a) Adaptation to changing images of the energy-climate problem  
(b) Connection of different communities with shared interests (i.e. a boundary object)  
(c) A technological focus, suiting prevailing conceptions of climate mitigation policy 
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1. Introduction 
The MARKAL energy system model was originally developed under the auspices of the International 
Energy Agency (IEA) in the late 1970s and is arguably one of the most successful energy models of 
recent decades. In 2001, Seebregts et al took the view that: “The MARKAL family of models is unique, 
benefiting from application in wide variety of settings and global technical support from the 
international research community. Implementation in more than 40 countries and by more than 80 
institutions, including developed, transitional, and developing economies indicates wide 
acceptability” [1, p. 75-76]. Since then, application of the model has continued to increase and today 
it is used in nearly 70 countries [2] and has provided underpinning analysis for more than 90 peer-
reviewed journal articles in the period 2004 to 2014. The United Kingdom (UK) Government and its 
agencies have been longstanding users of the MARKAL model and, in recent years, MARKAL 
modelling has been used extensively to inform UK energy and climate policy. Results from MARKAL 
have provided inputs to documents including the 2003 Energy White Paper [3], the 2007 Energy 
White Paper [4], the 2011 Carbon Plan [5] and the Committee on Climate Change reports Building a 
Low-carbon Economy [6] and The Fourth Carbon Budget [7]. 
 
In this paper, we describe the use of MARKAL in the UK and provide an account of its enduring 
appeal to academic and policy communities by reference to the concept of a boundary object [8, 9].  
Drawing on the authors’ collective experience of MARKAL, we interrogate its role in shaping UK 
energy and climate policy, with a particular focus on the period from 2001 to 2011. Our interest is 
not so much in MARKAL’s technical characteristics or policy application per se, but rather in how 
MARKAL has successfully served the differing but intersecting needs of academic and policy 
communities over a sustained period of time, helping to rationalise major and innovative climate 
and energy policy commitments. We suggest that MARKAL has brought together mutually 
supportive epistemic communities across academic and policy worlds, helping to develop and 
maintain a networked and influential community with shared assumptions and goals in which 
economic and technical models are privileged.  
 
Our motivation is to add to the body of work that understands energy system analysis as in need of 
social as well as technical contextualisation, but our findings also have relevance to other topical 
areas of energy social science, including communication and persuasion, social psychology and 
politics and political economy [10].  In short, we suggest that the particular characteristics of the 
MARKAL model – highly specialist, cost-based, technology-rich – have allowed it to span the differing 
but related logics of government and academia and sustained its use by these communities over 
several decades. 
 
We further reflect on how the model has both been advantaged by changing understandings 
(images) of the energy policy problem, as climate objectives have increased in importance, while 
also playing a role in policy path creation, supporting significant climate policy commitments.  
Seeking to explain the above, we connect literatures on (a) scientific models as active boundary 
objects in policy development and (b) the way in which changing images of a policy problem can 
allow new analytic and policy options to enter the political and policy space. We observe how 
MARKAL has played a transformative role in this context, while itself also being transformed, as the 
MARKAL modelling process has become target-oriented. Finally, we note how the use of MARKAL to 
support the policy process has not gone unchallenged. 
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2. Theory 
2.1 The MARKAL energy systems model 
The MARKAL energy model was originally developed as part of a programme of energy technology 
systems analysis and strategy development initiated in 1976 by IEA countries, in the aftermath of the 
1973/74 oil embargo by the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC).  In 1980, this 
programme became an Implementing Agreement of the IEA known as the Energy Technology 
Systems Analysis Programme and continues to support and promote the use of MARKAL to this day.  
 
MARKAL belongs to a class of bottom-up energy systems models. These models aim at a solution 
that satisfies the demand for energy services through a disaggregated and technology-oriented 
approach to modelling energy supply and demand.  In the case of MARKAL, the solution is usually 
represented as a set of technologies that represents the least cost configuration for an energy 
system that meets both the exogenously specified demands and any additional constraints, such as 
those on emissions.  Using this approach it is possible to identify the potential contributions of 
different energy supply and demand technologies under a wide range of future possible scenarios, 
as well as the costs involved. 
 
The original objective of the model was “to assess the long-term role of new technologies in the 
energy systems of the participating countries and thereby provide focus for current research-and-
development (R&D) support” [11, p. 353]. Specifically MARKAL was designed to help in 
understanding [ibid, p. 353-54]: 
“(a) the relative attractiveness of existing and new energy technologies and energy resources in 
satisfying plausible future demands for useful energy; 
(b) the time evolution of the introduction of and investment costs for new technologies and resources 
and the time evolution of the decline in use of existing resources, especially imported petroleum; 
(c) the sensitivity of future energy systems to different goal choices and ordering, with system cost, 
the amount of imported petroleum, and the relative contributions of nuclear, renewable, and fossil 
resources being the criteria of interest; and 
(d) the long-range effect of conservation and efficiency improvements on the energy system.” 
 
In recent years, MARKAL has been used by a wide-range of organisations in many different countries 
to model energy systems at a variety of spatial scales from global applications, through regional and 
national models, to the local-level, such as a single city [12 – 18]. These studies have also ranged in 
focus from analysing changes to the entire energy system to examining the prospects for particular 
sectors or technologies. New variants of the model have also been developed that have arguably 
increased its usefulness and relevance in both policy and academic circles, as we show in Section 4. 
 
2.2 Models, policy images and boundary objects 
In this section, we connect the idea of scientific models and their output as boundary objects to the 
theory of changing policy images (beliefs and values) as a facilitator of policy change. In this regard, 
external pressures can raise the political and policy salience of particular issues, enabling and driving 
change [19]. We also see the theory of policy change as punctuated equilibrium as particularly 
relevant. This perspective views policy change as taking the form of relatively long periods of stasis 
being ‘punctuated’ by shorter periods of change [20, 21] (c.f. Kingdon’s concept of a time-limited 
‘policy window’ [22]). Policy stasis is explained by the dominance of closed groups of policy experts, 
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which can be interrupted by a changing image or understanding of the nature of the policy problem 
[19]. Driving these changes are competitive processes, both between government departments and 
in wider society, in which actors seek to achieve policy change that is consistent with their agendas 
[21].  
 
Our argument is, firstly, that MARKAL’s changing use through the period circa 1990 to 2011 reflects a 
change in the prevalent image of the energy policy problem. This has been from one in which the UK 
government saw its primary role as setting a framework within which the market could deliver the 
energy needs of the country, to a policy image of a climate–constrained world in which radical 
changes to the UK energy system would be required, with the attendant need for more active 
government involvement to identify how this low carbon transition could be achieved and which 
technologies might require support. MARKAL has been well positioned to allow consideration of new 
goals and configurations for the energy system; moreover, the changing use and nature of MARKAL 
offer an insight into the changing perceptions of energy policy, as this became integrated with 
climate policy 
 
Secondly, that this changing use has been strongly supported by the way in which MARKAL and its 
output have successfully functioned as a boundary object, simultaneously connecting and meeting 
needs in different communities, providing and supporting shared understandings of the changing 
image of the policy problem. As van Egmond and Zeiss [21] observe, the idea of the boundary object 
has proved useful in explaining the hybrid nature of scientific models used in policy - that is, the way 
in which such models are not only based on mathematical representations of the world, but are also 
shaped by, and play a role in shaping, the social world in which they are embedded [21, 23]. Science 
and policy scholars have previously studied the relationship between modelling practices and policy 
practices [24 – 27], in general observing that models play a role in co-ordinating policy practice. This 
is not just in the rhythm of modelling runs and policy use of modelling output, but more specifically 
in terms of the way in which models provide ’discursive spaces’ in which shared understandings are 
created between modellers and  policymakers [25]. Previous understandings (shared perspectives) 
are made tangible in the form of numbers and their implications. In this way, models make policy in 
a sense that is stronger than simply informing: depending on their mode of use, they can define the 
terms in which questions are posed and answers given. Through the process of their use, the 
different parties involved retain their own norms and natures but they are connected by the model, 
which satisfies the needs of all [8].  
 
Bringing these ideas together, we can see that scientific models may, through their role as boundary 
objects that facilitate intersecting agendas in different communities, support the entry of new ideas 
and perspectives into policy discourse. In turn, this can facilitate and reinforce new policy images 
and hence policy change. We draw on the different types of boundary object identified by Star’s [9] 
and Carlile’s [28] specification of the characteristics of successful boundary objects, arguing that 
MARKAL’s longevity owes much to both its successful functioning as a boundary object and the 
supportive contingency (circumstances) of a changing image of the energy policy problem that has 
favoured technological innovation and intervention.  
 
The idea of the boundary object developed from the application and development of the ideas of 
translation and interessement in the actor network (ANT) literature [8, 29]. Essentially this concerns 
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the recruitment of human and non-human entities into networks for a given purpose. Those 
recruiting need to persuade potential recruits that engagement in the proposed activity will be to 
their benefit. In an historical case study of Berkeley’s Museum of Vertebrate Zoology, Star and 
Griesemer [8] show how objects such as preserved animal and plant specimens functioned as 
boundary objects in their connection of different social and professional interests, including the 
museum scientists, conservationists and trappers. These people pursued their own agendas but also 
co-operated to mutual benefit, with the objects constituting their point of interconnection. 
 
Two decades later Star revisited the boundary object, in part to emphasise how the concept goes 
beyond the interpretative flexibility that is inherent in all objects and indeed on which, as Star 
observes, constructivism relies [30]. She observed that those using the boundary object concept 
have rarely referred to aspects other than its interpretative flexibility: other attributes of the 
concept include the material and organizational structure of different types of boundary objects and 
the issue of scale or granularity. Here we make use of the former in connection with Carlile’s work 
[28]. Similarly, our case also emphasises the importance of information and professional spheres 
[30], as do other cases making use of the boundary object idea [28, 31, 32]. Star also refers to the 
way in which a boundary object may become standardized and eventually exclude others and we 
discuss this too. The most fundamental, defining feature of a boundary object, however, remains its 
active connection of different social worlds with different agendas.  It is this that we argue MARKAL 
has achieved over a sustained period of time. 
 
Helping to define a successful boundary object, both Carlile [28] and Fong et al [33] consider the 
applied problem of knowledge management across functional boundaries in the context of 
manufacturing and engineering project management. Carlile refers to two pre-identified aspects of 
spanning knowledge boundaries and proposes a third, complementary aspect. The first aspect of a 
successful boundary object is termed syntactic and implies the need to establish an agreed, shared 
and stable syntax or means of communication across contexts (e.g. the hexadecimal zero or one in 
binary computer code and associated rules) [28]. The second, semantic aspect concerns the ability to 
convey meaning and relates to the interpretation of information transmitted, based on the premise 
that the same information can often be interpreted differently [ibid]. The third aspect Carlile terms 
pragmatic in recognition of the way in which particular knowledge often has indirect consequences 
that are significant and which may have a bearing on the willingness of groups or individuals to share 
that knowledge, but which are not intrinsic to the knowledge itself. These indirect consequences will 
often relate to social, commercial or financial interests and agendas [28].  
 
Carlile [28] further argues that a successful boundary object is one that enables the above aspects to 
be clarified, negotiated and dealt with by different social groups who have over-lapping interests. 
We suggest not only that MARKAL has performed these functions well across groups with a close 
interest in energy policy, but that it also does so by spanning Star’s (exemplar) categories of 
boundary objects [9]. As summarised by Carlile these are: repositories (e.g. databases) that supply a 
common reference point; standardized forms and methods that provide a shared format for solving 
problems; objects or models, representations that can be used across contexts; maps of boundaries, 
which may overlap with the objects or models category, and which represent the dependencies and 
boundaries that exist between different groups or functions at a more systemic level (e.g. process 
maps and computer simulations). 
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Much of the boundary object and organisation literature concerns collaboration under conditions of 
dissensus or disagreement [31]. In the context that we study here, while energy and climate policy 
have long been subject to different periods of political contestation, there has been at least a 
discursive-level consensus in the UK regarding the need to mitigate greenhouse gases (GHGs), with 
disagreement being focussed primarily on the nature of appropriate policy responses. MARKAL’s 
role in this has been to act as a means of exploring some of those policy options, arguably relying on 
the epistemically privileged position of science [34, 35] to play the role of a ‘value-neutral’ tool.  
Rather than connecting positions of fundamental policy dissensus, therefore, what MARKAL has 
done is to connect communities of practice [36] that have different institutional and professional 
logics and rationales. Whereas academics tend to have an interest in opening up debate, policy 
practitioners more often have an interest in closing it down (cf [37]). Yet MARKAL has satisfied both. 
Often this connecting role falls to boundary organisations acting as intermediaries between different 
social and professional worlds, including those dealing with climate science and other environmental 
policy [38, 39], rather than to objects such as models. Here, though, it is the decision-aid itself that 
we focus on.  
 
In this regard it is also worth observing that MARKAL plays a role as a scientific, value-neutral tool, 
despite embodying a variety of value-laden assumptions and what are essentially educated guesses 
as to future technology costs. As Haefele and Rogner [40, p. 344] said of IIASA modelling in the 
1980s, "we consider such modeling a craft and not a science or an art": arguably this applies equally 
to MARKAL and to any models where input assumptions regarding the future strongly condition 
model output, but where the reliability of those assumptions is at the same time unavoidably 
uncertain and unknown. 
 
3. Materials and methods 
To provide data for the above argument, we have thematically organised the literature relating to 
UK government use of MARKAL over an extended period from the late 1970s. Some 70 policy and 
other documents have been examined, with close analysis of 21 items. Selection of organising 
themes was guided by the objective of providing a relatively neutral overview of the history of 
MARKAL usage in the UK, knowledge of which is grounded in personal experience of MARKAL by 
members of the author team, some of this being close and sustained for many years1. Specifically, 
the organising themes are: (i) the stated goals and policy ambition of the document supported by 
MARKAL; (ii) the specific role of MARKAL in providing that support; (iii) related policy positions and 
modelling context; (iv) explicit and implicit criticisms, acknowledgement of limitations and defence 
of MARKAL. A list of the main data sources is provided as supplementary material to this paper. 
 
The literature examined includes government policy documents, parliamentary committee 
documents, statements from non-governmental organisations and some related expert critique of 
MARKAL. A database of literature was assembled as above and organised and searched with Nvivo, 
in addition to manual coding, with the search focusing on references to models and MARKAL. 
                                                             
1 The authors collectively have many decades of experience in developing and running different versions of the 
MARKAL model in the UK and internationally, as well as working with others to frame model inputs and 
analysing and interpreting model outputs for both academic and policy purposes. 
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Changing use over time was evidenced and tracked, with this use being observable in the application 
of the model, i.e. the purposes to which it was put. Evidence for the changing policy image of the 
energy problem is inferred from the change in policy objectives, which are treated as external to 
(though supported by) the model. Inference of the functioning of MARKAL as a boundary object is 
primarily based on observation of its simultaneous use: (a) in support of key UK Government energy-
climate policy documents; (b) in support of recommendations by the UK Committee on Climate 
Change regarding greenhouse gas emissions budgets and (c) by the small UK academic-consultancy 
modelling community. We relate the historical overview to boundary object characteristics and 
categories in the Discussion. 
 
4. Results 
4.1 Use of MARKAL by the UK Government 
Changing images of the energy policy problem have enabled MARKAL to shift from an initial role in 
technology assessment, driven by concerns about oil import dependency; to a context of liberalised 
energy markets in the 1990s in which its main use was to identify priorities for R&D; to a key role in 
target-oriented climate policy, as reducing greenhouse gas emissions increased in policy salience 
through the 2000s. This shift involved a change from using the model to focus on the relative 
prospects of specific technologies in order to inform R&D priorities, towards a focus on the costs and 
possible evolution of the entire energy system to meet carbon targets.  Even more particularly, it 
came to involve the use of MARKAL to envisage radical changes in that system: MARKAL as a 
quantitative visioning, scenario generation tool. Throughout these changes, the model continued to 
play a valuable role for the key parties involved.  
 
4.1.1 Use of MARKAL before the year 2000 
The UK was involved in the initial development of the MARKAL model through the participation of 
scientists from the UK Atomic Energy Authority (UKAEA). Early results from the development and 
application of a UK MARKAL model were presented to an IEA Steering Group in 1979 and then 
formally published in 1980 [41].  Much of the early modelling used scenarios that considered the 
trade-off between price (measured as the total cost of the energy system) and security of supply 
(represented by the quantity of imported oil) under different assumptions about the availability and 
rate of deployment of a range of new energy technologies [42, 43]. During the early 1980s scientists 
from UKAEA continued to use MARKAL in a number of projects that both further developed the 
software and applied the model to examine various aspects of the UK energy system [44]. 
Nevertheless, probably because of the Government’s hands-off approach to energy policy at this 
time [45], use of the model declined over the decade, with the UK reporting in 1989 that the 
Department of Energy had not made “comprehensive use of the MARKAL facility in recent years” [46, 
p. 11-2].  
 
However, in the early 1990s the UK MARKAL model was completely reconfigured and updated, and 
used by the Energy Technology Support Unit (ETSU), then part of UKAEA, to underpin a major 
appraisal for government of the prospects for a wide range of energy technologies and the 
implications for associated RD&D programmes [47], and a related assessment of renewable energy 
[48]. Summaries of the results, describing the use of MARKAL, were published in 1994 by the 
Department of Trade and Industry as Energy Papers 61 and 62 respectively [49, 50].  Over the 
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following four years, the UK MARKAL model was modified and enhanced by ETSU (which was 
privatised as part of AEA Technology plc. in 1996) in a variety of studies for the Department of Trade 
and Industry. This included further assessments of the future prospects for renewable energy in 
support of the UK New and Renewable Energy Programme [51] and analysing the implications of 
abating air pollutant emissions from the UK energy system for the Energy and Environment 
Programme [52].  
 
Despite this increased use, MARKAL remained at the periphery of mainstream energy policy-making 
in the UK for most of the 1990s, with the Government preferring to rely on quantitative analysis 
from econometric models operated by the Department of Energy and later the Department of Trade 
and Industry. These models principally relied on the historical analysis of drivers and trends in 
energy markets to provide insights about how they may evolve in the future and the implications for 
CO2 emissions [53 – 55]. Policy-makers were mostly interested in understanding how future energy 
supply and demand would evolve, rather than asking questions about how it could or should 
develop. So for example, one of the main aims of the projections published in 1995 in Energy Paper 
65 was “to monitor the general development and direction of energy markets….” [54, p. 6].  
Econometric models are well suited to analysing relatively stable energy markets, such as those seen 
in the late 1980-90s when past trends and relationships could reasonably be expected to continue.  
They are not, however, suitable for envisaging large, long-term transitions in the technological 
make-up of an energy system, such as the kind that would be needed to tackle the problem of 
climate change. 
 
4.1.2 Use of MARKAL after 2000 
Since 2000, the environmental goals of energy policy, particularly in relation to climate change, have 
come to dominate in the UK. The 22nd report of the Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution 
(RCEP): ‘Energy – The Changing Climate’, published in 2000, played a highly influential role in this 
process, urging the government to ‘adopt a strategy which puts the UK on a path to reducing carbon 
dioxide emissions by some 60% from [2000] levels by about 2050’ [56, p. 28].   
 
These changing priorities meant that policy-makers needed energy models that could answer 
different questions; among the most important being the expected costs of meeting a given 
emissions reduction target and the portfolio of technologies needed to make those emissions 
reductions. A MARKAL-type model is well suited to providing answers to both of these questions in 
terms acceptable to the bureaucratic norms regarding the appraisal of proposals by the public 
sector, as embodied in the Treasury Green Book [57]. Moreover, it provides a way to imagine, 
comprehend and explore the dynamics of the complexity of the energy system and to identify 
potential technological pathways to meeting targets. Both themes are evident in the sections below, 
where we show how MARKAL has served the needs of intersecting UK constituencies. 
 
4.1.2.1 The 2003 Energy White Paper 
In 2001, AEA Technology plc was commissioned by the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) to 
use MARKAL in a project “to develop a range of ‘bottom-up’ estimates of carbon dioxide emissions 
from the UK energy sector up to 2050, and to identify the technical possibilities and costs for the 
abatement of these emissions” [58, p. 6]. The results of this project were reported in the 2003 
Energy White Paper (2003 EWP) Our Energy Future [3].  
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Responding to the challenge of climate change, the EWP2003 set out to give “a new direction in 
energy policy” [3, p. 3] and acknowledged that “until now the UK’s energy policy has not paid enough 
attention to environmental problems” [3, p. 8]. Here the changing image of policy problem provided 
an opportunity to use MARKAL to explore whether there were plausible future configurations of the 
energy system that could deliver the 60 % CO2 reduction recommended by the RCEP. The EWP gives 
significant prominence to MARKAL results relating to the economic costs of the transition, including 
its impact on future levels of GDP and the costs of carbon abatement per tonne2. This led to the 
2003 EWP concluding that “[our analysis] suggests that the cost impact of effectively tackling climate 
change would be very small” [3, p. 9] and the estimates from MARKAL were noted as being 
consistent with values in a review by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.  
 
In an evaluation of the RCEP report, the Institute for European Environmental Policy [60, p. 51] notes 
the importance of the MARKAL analysis: “DTI carried out a parallel modelling exercise using the 
MARKAL model, and concluded from this that the technology required could be installed at a 
relatively modest cost…… It is understood that this exercise overcame a key barrier to acceptance of 
the 60 per cent target, and appears greatly to have helped develop a positive attitude to carbon 
reductions in government.” 
 
However, the findings of the White Paper, and the role played by MARKAL, were not without their 
critics. During a hearing of the House of Lords Select Committee on Economic Affairs, Dr. Dieter 
Helm of the University of Oxford noted: “The MARKAL model …. was used to produce the answer in 
the White Paper, which suggests that the cost to the GDP of this 60 per cent reduction in CO2 by 2050 
would be so low as to be equivalent to the error term in forecasting forward.….What you see going in 
determines what comes out the other end. That is where my criticisms of the assumptions going into 
the model, in particular in respect of the costs of wind and the cost of energy efficiency, have been 
published. That is why in the detail I do not happen to subscribe to the notion that the GDP costs of 
all this are low” [61, Qu. 271]. 
 
The Government defended their use of MARKAL, explaining that “a very high amount of sensitivity 
analysis was carried out in the process” [61, Qu. 304]. However, Helm’s evidence and that of other 
critics led to the House of Lords concluding that “We are concerned that UK energy and climate 
policy appears to rest on a very debatable model of the energy-economic system and on dubious 
assumptions about the costs of meeting the long run 60% target” [62, para. 94]. Despite this, and we 
suggest drawing strength from the heightening policy salience of climate change, MARKAL continued 
to play an important analytical role as the Government further developed its more pro-active energy 
policy.  
 
 
                                                             
2 The figures for GDP loss were not a direct output from the model (the version of MARKAL used could not 
calculate these). Rather, they were calculated off-model using MARKAL output and additional simple 
assumptions. A DTI memo describing the 2003 EWP modelling notes that “there is great uncertainty about the 
forecasts which [MARKAL] provides” [48, p. 5] and that “this type of approach is better suited to consideration 
of long-run impacts than transitional costs” [ibid, p. 6].  
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4.1.2.2 The 2007 Energy White Paper 
In 2007 the Government released another Energy White Paper ‘Meeting the Energy Challenge’ [4]. 
This made use of a newer version of MARKAL, known as MARKAL-MACRO, which links MARKAL to a 
simple macro-economic model. Unlike the standard version of MARKAL, MARKAL-MACRO can 
directly estimate the impacts on GDP of emissions reduction. Use of this new model broadly 
confirmed the earlier off-model estimates of GDP impacts, but many of the limitations associated 
with the 2003 MARKAL version, such as the omission of transition and behavioural costs, were still 
relevant. 
 
Perhaps as a result of the earlier criticism, the EWP 2007 discusses in some detail the costs estimates 
and their limitations, making clear how and why MARKAL results can “be expected to produce lower-
bound estimates of the costs of carbon abatement” [4, p. 292]. Additionally, the 2007 EWP 
compensates for some of the weaknesses of MARKAL by also drawing on the results of other 
models, notably the Oxford Energy Industry Model, which was used to capture the short term 
dynamics of reducing carbon emissions and thus to investigate the significance of transition costs 
[63].  
 
Yet the use of MARKAL to support the 2007 EWP went far beyond calculating GDP impacts. The 2007 
EWP explains its use of MARKAL-MACRO in the following terms: “for the period to 2050, we have 
used a model of the entire UK energy system (UK MARKAL-MACRO model) to explore the changes to 
the amount and use of energy required if we are to deliver our goal of reducing carbon emissions by 
60% by 2050 at least cost” [4, p. 194]. The EWP itself contains fourteen direct references to various 
insights from the modelling work and these instances are further complemented by numerous 
graphical figures in the supplementary material supporting the White Paper [64]. These include 
projections of sectoral abatement levels and changes in the primary energy mix through to 2050.   
 
4.1.2.3 The 2008 Climate Change Act and 2011 UK Carbon Plan 
Following the 2007 EWP, the Government published a draft Climate Change Bill, which became an 
Act of Parliament in 2008. This put in place a new legislative framework of five-year carbon budgets 
and established an independent Committee on Climate Change (CCC) to advise government on the 
level of these budgets. A long-term emissions target was written into the Act, but strengthened from 
the original 60% recommended by the RCEP to become an 80% emissions reduction target by 2050 
[65].  
 
The most recent use of MARKAL within UK energy policy has been in The Carbon Plan (CP), published 
by the government in 2011 [5], which sets out proposals and policies for meeting the first four 
carbon budgets (covering the period to 2027). This report made use of the Elastic Demand version of 
MARKAL (see Section 4.2) to envisage how best to achieve emission reduction targets [66]. The CP 
states that “in line with our principle of seeking the most cost effective technology mix, our starting 
point for this has been to take the outputs of the ‘core’ run of the cost-optimising model, MARKAL” 
and that this core run “illustrat[es] the technologies likely to contribute to reducing emissions, and 
the most cost effective timing for their deployment” [5, p. 16].  
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4.2 Use of MARKAL by the Committee on Climate Change 
While the CCC shares the need of central government to analyse costs and technology pathways, it is 
not in the position of having to justify specific legislative proposals. Government departments have a 
strong need for tools that provide closure around specific options, whereas the CCC is able to take a 
more reflective and advisory approach – including more explicit acknowledgement of the many 
uncertainties. 
 
The CCC report ‘Building a Low-carbon Economy’ [6] uses the MARKAL Elastic Demand (MED) model 
to examine the economic and technological implications of reducing carbon emissions by both 80% 
and 90% by 2050 [67, 68]. MED is another variant on the standard version of the MARKAL model, in 
which the level of demand for energy services varies according to the costs of meeting them, based 
on a set of user-specified price elasticities. The report describes at some length the main attributes 
of MARKAL and how the MED version differs from the standard model. It also discusses the various 
model runs that were undertaken and the implications of the results for policy.  
 
A number of the major conclusions from the report were supported by results from MARKAL. These 
included that “the costs of meeting the 80% target are affordable” [6, p. xvii], “decarbonisation of 
the power sector is key to achieving emission reduction targets” [6, p. xv] and that “[low carbon 
electricity] would also support decarbonisation of other sectors, namely heat and transport” [6, p. 
xvi]. 
 
A frequently referenced limitation of the MARKAL model is the assumption of perfect foresight, 
meaning that the model is unable to capture the impact of uncertainty associated with factors such 
as technological innovation rates or fuel prices. While this limitation of modelling results is 
acknowledged and discussed in publications from government departments, modelling in support of 
the CCC’s fourth carbon budget report [7] goes much further to overcome these limitations. This was 
achieved by using the stochastic formulation of MARKAL to deepen the focus on a whole range of 
uncertainties [69].  The result of this approach is that one is able to study optimal ‘hedging’ 
strategies in the face of key mid-term uncertainties. This goes some way to studying the importance 
of the implicit assumption of certainty that the normal MARKAL procedure embodies.  As the CCC 
note “while, in reality, uncertainty is not typically resolved at a single point in time known in advance, 
using this functionality helps to provide insights into appropriate planning responses under 
uncertainty” [7, p. 120].  
 
4.3 Use of MARKAL by the academic modelling community 
Until 2005, the use of MARKAL in the UK had been confined to government agencies or 
consultancies working under contract for government, rather than academia. This changed with the 
advent of the UK Energy Research Centre (UKERC), funded by the UK Research Councils’ Energy 
Programme. A key priority, identified early on by UKERC, was the need to enhance the UK’s ability to 
conduct analysis of the energy system as whole, through an energy system modelling capacity [70]. 
UKERC negotiated access to the UK MARKAL model with the DTI and funded the capacity to conduct 
a significant revision to the model database.  
 
For the UK academic community, MARKAL has provided a tool for examining a series of issues in 
energy system evolution and, in the case of some model variants, for exploring a (limited) set of 
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interactions between these energy system developments and wider economy. The researchers using 
it have, over time, endeavoured to test the importance of different structural model features in 
providing enhanced understanding of energy system dynamics.  This has been achieved through a 
series of projects that have both applied different variants of the model developed by the ETSAP 
community, and linked the UK MARKAL model to a number of other analytical frameworks. The 
development of a UK version of the MARKAL-MACRO model in 2007 was a major experimental test 
of the importance of macro-economic feedbacks on energy system development [71]. Subsequent 
model experiments have examined the importance of spatially-constrained infrastructures by linking 
MARKAL to a geographical information system [72], enabling representation of demand-responses 
to price rises through the use of MARKAL-ED [73], examining regional representation [74], and 
testing the importance of uncertainty and assumptions about foresight with Stochastic-MARKAL 
[69]. 
 
These examples illustrate the value of the model as perceived by its academic users – it provides a 
system for examining the potential importance or otherwise of system elements (technologies, 
policies, costs) as well as perspectives and decision heuristics (macro-economic equilibrium, 
stochastic optimisation, the importance of spatial resolution). These experimental developments 
have been understood principally as intellectual exercises seeking to unpick the relative importance 
of different structural relationships within the energy system, not as simple answers to policy 
questions. However, the policy-relevance of the work has always been evident (as witnessed by the 
use of the models by policy-makers), and the potential of the model to inform policy is a clear part of 
the value that researchers see in the work [70]. 
 
This dual research and policy role creates some tensions. Modellers are keen to deliver to 
policymakers the insights that they believe can be most usefully drawn, while being at pains to 
communicate the limitations of the approach. Nonetheless, this has proved to be consistently 
challenging. A tool that provides a highly detailed picture of 50 years of future energy system 
development naturally lends itself to over-interpretation—it is easy to see it as a forecast or ‘truth 
machine’.  The following quote, from a working paper reporting MARKAL results published by 
UKERC, exemplifies the way that modellers are keen to provide caveats about what the model is 
seeking to do. “An important point to re-stress is that MARKAL is not a forecasting model and does 
not predict the future UK energy system over the next 50 years. Instead it offers a systematic tool to 
explore the trade-offs and tipping points between alternative energy system pathways, and the cost, 
energy supply and emissions implications of these alternative pathways” [75, p. iv]. The extent to 
which policy users choose to take heed of such caveats is likely in part to be influenced by particular 
policy preferences and objectives at the time. 
 
MARKAL provides a synthesising framework through which consistent representations of possible 
futures can be explored. This is valuable not only for the academics directly involved in using the 
model – it also provides a set of scenarios that can be used by other academics as background 
conditions against which to conduct their own work. This is a useful function – if one wants to use a 
scenario of future carbon intensity of the power sector, for example, a MARKAL output provides this 
as part of a broader, internally consistent energy scenario. As a result, the model outputs condition 
the intellectual and future-oriented thinking of the energy research community more broadly – a 
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role that has earned it critics as well as support for its conditioning and legitimating of particular 
ways of thinking about energy policy.  
 
5. Discussion 
Our argument is that an evolving image of the challenges facing UK energy policy has supported 
changing but sustained, if differentiated, use of MARKAL by several different but intersecting policy 
communities.  MARKAL and its output have successfully connected social groups, or communities of 
practice [36], with different but related understandings. From information flow and systems 
perspectives, Fong et al [33, p. 16-17], similarly to Carlile [28] observe that the value of a boundary 
object depends primarily on how well it can “decontextualize knowledge on one side of a boundary 
and recontextualize it on the other side.”  MARKAL is far from readily comprehensible to all, but we 
suggest that its technological focus has given it an enduring appeal to those with private or public 
interests in advancing the new technologies required for energy system transformation. We 
illustrate some of these features of MARKAL in Table 1, organised by Carlile’s [28] categorisation. 
 
Table 1 Boundary object characteristics in MARKAL (after [28]) 
Model features Syntactic Semantic Pragmatic 
Metrics Monetary, energetic and 
emissions units of 
measurement 
The key metrics have 
intellectual and political 
comprehensibility across 
contexts 
The key metrics matter 
across contexts: they 
have policy legitimacy, 
significance and 
implications for 
regulatory regimes, fiscal 
regimes and R&D funding 
programmes 
Ability to model 
future, 
technologically-
focussed scenarios 
Relatively consensual 
definitions of the 
environmental 
performance of particular 
technologies 
Shared understanding of 
the nature of specific 
technologies 
Technological innovation 
widely perceived as 
desirable and supported 
by various constituencies 
Optimisation Single, clear definition of 
‘best’ outcome for the 
energy system 
Shared understanding of 
criteria against which to 
evaluate system 
performance  
Alignment with 
bureaucratic norms of 
policy appraisal 
 
The model has a number of other, interrelated attributes that lend themselves to playing a boundary 
object role. First, its primary decision criterion is cost, which is given primacy in much UK policy 
decision-making because of the importance of the Treasury Green Book guidance. Second, MARKAL 
makes it possible to imagine, comprehend and explore the dynamics of long-term energy systems 
change in an internally consistent way, and it thus provides one form of understanding of how long-
term targets might be achieved. This meets a need of both academic researchers trying to 
systematically understand the evolution of energy systems and of the policy community who are 
interested in the implications of alternative energy system configurations. Finally, MARKAL results 
lend themselves to flexible discursive representation: that is, the model’s mode of analysis, being 
scenario based, and its relatively complex nature and output, lend themselves to alternative and 
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selective interpretation, representation and also generation through iterative runs under changed 
starting conditions. 
 
As a technology-centred, optimisation model, MARKAL sets in the foreground the more knowable 
and more analytically tractable elements of developments in the energy landscape, while leaving in 
the background the associated changes to the political, cultural and behavioural dimensions that 
also will be needed, as well as (largely) the implications for the macro-economy. In giving the image 
of a clear, technology-based pathway, the model also provides some sense of control over the 
structure and evolution of the energy system. As such, it facilitates the (perhaps tacit) belief that it is 
possible to ‘plan’ an explicitly ‘optimal’ (in cost terms) transition to a low-carbon energy system. 
Indeed, one of MARKAL’s appeals is that, in contrast to econometric modelling approaches, it is not 
confined by historical relationships and hence allows users to envisage radically different energy 
systems.  
 
This capacity for facilitating new visions and new scenarios seems to help in gaining consensus 
across influential communities. One could even say that there is an affective role to scenario tools 
such as MARKAL, in that they give hope that different energy futures are possible. In a sense such 
tools are socially progressive, capable of supporting the imagining of radically different futures, freed 
from modelling the constraints imposed by some of the more difficult realities noted earlier. Others, 
too, have commented on the role of technological imaginaries in aspects of UK energy policy [76]. To 
date little has been said of the role of models in this regard, which we suggest in the case of MARKAL 
has been highly influential.  
 
Yet, as noted above, the aspects of the future that MARKAL envisages are limited and largely 
technical. MARKAL is able to examine radical change within the energy system but the model is not 
designed to capture directly those dimensions of change that are more emergent, uncertain, 
ungovernable and harder to quantify. These include aspects of political, social, corporate and other 
understandings of, and responses to, attempts to manage a transition. In turn these relate to, for 
example, perceptions of the distribution of costs and benefits to different parts of society; issues of 
market structure; the institutional and policy arrangements required to enact change as depicted in 
MARKAL scenario results; and the culturally and socially embedded nature and determinants of 
consumer energy demand. In short, MARKAL can envisage new technical configurations for the 
energy system but questions about the political feasibility of achieving such changes, and the 
institutional arrangements and political strategies necessary for this, are unaddressed. Arguably, the 
absence of such considerations in the model or their reduction to indirect representation (e.g. 
through user-defined constraints), helps to connect elite communities by the act of elision: 
controversy is avoided or reduced by the reductionist shift to technical parameters. Thus, the nature 
of MARKAL itself determines what can and cannot be modelled and further shapes policy through its 
own authority and the legitimacy given to its output, particularly through the privileging of techno-
economic and numerical information.  
 
In section 2.2, we refer to Star’s observation that over time a boundary object can become 
standardized and hence exclusive [30]. This may have mixed consequences: on the one hand it 
strengthens and to some extent institutionalises the object, while on the other it hinders debate and 
resists challenge – even if that challenge may be seen by some as justified (e.g. the critique of 
15 
 
technocratic and scientistic models by Stirling [77]). Table 2 illustrates some examples of the 
challenges that MARKAL has resisted and the justifications put forth in its defence (also see section 
4.1.2.1 above). While resistance to challenge is not a necessary or sufficient condition for an entity 
to function as a boundary object, it is an attribute that follows from the ability to secure consensus 
among influential parties.  
 
Table 2 Critique, justification and defence of the use of MARKAL for the 2003 Energy White Paper  
Document text Source 
The results depend on the assumptions - on technology availability and costs - that are 
made in the model. However, the assumptions used reflected expert opinion, informed by 
workshops with industry experts. 
[3, p. 28] 
The basic structure of the model, therefore, is that it might be expected to produce fairly 
low estimates of costs to GDP.  i. because it is looking to the long-term it is not concerned 
with adjustment costs associated with markets being out of balance; ii. because it contains 
no information about hidden costs or other barriers that may constrain the take-up of 
otherwise cost-effective options. 
[59, p. 7] 
…….. we must be careful in the way we use MARKAL and in the conclusions we draw from 
it. In our work we have been trying to test out various visions of the future – not to predict 
a single picture for 2050, or the path towards it. We have explored different assumptions 
……….. On the basis of that wide range of analyses we are then looking for general 
conclusions that seem to be robust across the model runs, or for what the sensitivities can 
tell us about what matters most in leading to either relatively low or high costs of moving 
to a low carbon economy. Used in this way the approach can give useful insights. 
[59, p. 5] 
The MARKAL results look to be very much in the range of the results from that wider 
review. 
[59, p. 7] 
It is very important in this context to bear in mind that one of the advantages of MARKAL is 
to show you that if you pick certain assumptions you get particular answers. It turns out 
the government was deeply interested in a solution to the climate change problem which 
was largely based on wind and energy efficiency and not much else, particularly not 
nuclear power. It matters which precise assumptions are used as to which policies 
ministers and their officials think are the most efficient policies to pursue. What I am 
suggesting is this is extremely thin ice. The policies chosen depend upon the assumptions 
that went into that model and I am not at all clear in the policy process that the people 
making decisions fully understood how dependent they were on the nature of the 
assumptions that were going into the answer. 
[61, Qu. 271] 
 
On MARKAL, it is one of the great strengths of MARKAL that it is a garbage in, garbage out 
model. All good models are garbage in, garbage out. The way you assess a model is: are 
the inputs garbage? Any model where you put in garbage and produce useful knowledge 
would be a very curious model indeed. It is not at all a criticism of MARKAL.  
[61, Qu. 407] 
 
MARKAL is a widely used and tried modelling framework which has around 150 licensed 
users world-wide and has been applied in different variants in several countries including 
the US, the Netherlands, China and Japan. 
[78, p. 17]. 
 
 
At the same time, though, MARKAL has experienced a number of developmental stages and 
different versions of the models can be and have been used, tailored for different purposes. This 
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gives the model a somewhat different identity in different contexts, as different versions of the tool 
are – in Star’s words [30] ‘tacked’ between. For example, the elastic demand version of MARKAL was 
developed by academics as part of a UK Energy Research Centre project [75] to examine a broad 
range of decarbonisation pathways for the UK and later modified by AEA Technology on behalf of 
the CCC (for instance the global discount rate was lowered from 10 % to 3.5 % to align with policy 
appraisal norms) to investigate a smaller range of carbon reduction targets and policies to help 
inform its advice to the UK Government on future carbon budgets [67]. 
 
In our view, MARKAL and newer, similar models (such as the recent IEA-ETSAP model called TIMES 
[79] and the ESME model developed by the Energy Technologies Institute [80]) are unlikely to be 
replaced in their particular role until the policy image of the climate-energy problem changes once 
again, or until alternative models are perceived to perform the same role in a better or preferable 
way.  In this respect, UK energy modelling has been described as in need of a broader range of 
analytical tools [70] and perhaps a likely scenario (and one that is showing some signs of being 
realised) is that MARKAL becomes supplemented by a number of tools suited for related but 
different purposes: as and when the energy-policy problem becomes perceived as more 
differentiated and multi-faceted, so opportunities for policy entry by additional and/or alternative 
tools will arise. If these tools are to succeed, it is important that they, too, are able to deliver output 
capable of being rendered (translated) by and for multiple influential constituencies and, moreover, 
of supporting the interests of those communities. 
 
Sustaining a role as a boundary spanning object in this context requires an ability to respond to 
changes in the wider priorities and concerns of the day; at least, the concerns of the modellers and 
the various government agencies commissioning modelling work. Scenarios and model-based 
projections tend to reflect the concerns of their time [81] and MARKAL appears to have been no 
exception. Thus the sequence of MARKAL work in the UK reveals a shift away from a limited set of 
questions in the 1990s ('how should we spend R&D money?’ [47, 48, 49, 50]), reflecting a more 
laissez-faire approach to energy policy, towards questions relating to a more technology-focused, 
interventionist and centralised approach to energy strategy. The early 2000s saw questions about 
the ‘feasibility’ of significant GHG reductions [3, 56, 58], followed by questions about the 
‘affordability’ of deep cuts [4, 64, 82]. At a time when climate change concern was at its height, 
MARKAL scenarios were generated to reflect very deep decarbonisation targets, up to 95%, 
reflecting ambitious 'how low can we go' rhetoric about climate change [67].  
 
Once social and political consensus around the need for decarbonisation became entrenched in 
legislation, use of MARKAL also shifted towards questions about technology choices and pathways 
[66, 75]. Moreover, ‘uncertainty’ regarding the choice of pathways became a more central concern 
(as exemplified in the development of stochastic MARKAL for the UK Climate Change Committee 
[69] and the increasing use of the related model ESME [83] which highlights uncertainty around 
input parameters). In this respect study of models, policy analysis tools and their use can provide as 
much insight into key actors’ understandings of the world as insight into the nature of the tools 
themselves. 
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6. Conclusions 
We have described the way in which the MARKAL energy system model and its variants have 
achieved significant influence in UK energy and climate policy over a considerable period of time. 
We have accounted for this influence in terms of MARKAL and its output being transferable across 
contexts and both timely and flexible in its ability to fulfil a policy need for an energy model that 
supports alternative, technological, long term visions that are freed from some of the constraints of 
econometric alternatives. MARKAL’s target-oriented capabilities and technological focus arguably 
reduce the opportunity for controversy and political friction, while serving the needs of private as 
well as public sector constituencies with an interest in the major research, innovation and 
deployment needs of energy system transformation. Despite the relative opacity of the model for 
outside observers, and the limitations of numerical models in terms of capturing important 
qualitative aspects of energy system change, for the time being MARKAL continues to function as a 
successful boundary object, capable of being deployed in response to changing images of the 
climate-energy policy problem.  
 
In this regard, MARKAL’s policy use meets Star and Griesemier’s [8] basic attribute of a boundary 
object, namely the connection of social worlds in a form that can differ from more localised 
(academic) versions. We have also shown how MARKAL has the more specific, subsidiary attributes 
of a boundary object as identified by Carlile and others [28, 33]. Moreover we have referred to the 
scale of use of MARKAL internationally, this being another of Star’s conditions for a boundary object 
[30]. Although we haven’t been able to trace and compare this use internationally, this would make 
for another interesting project. It also remains to be seen how the model fares as alternatives begin 
to come to prominence. In terms of other, further work, it would be instructive to consider a 
broader range of energy-climate policy tools and knowledge-commissioning processes as part of 
science-policy interfaces, specifically in energy policy contexts, not only in the UK, but internationally 
(cf [32]). Certainly in our experience of UK and other national energy policy, modelling-related 
epistemic communities have proved and continue to prove relatively understudied but influential 
networks. 
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Supplementary Material 
Table A1 Key data sources  
Year Organisation Title of document and web address Supporting model (MARKAL) 
resources / Further details 
2003 Department 
of Trade and 
Industry 
White Paper: Our energy future - creating a low 
carbon economy   
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/2009
1002214428/http://www.berr.gov.uk/files/file10
719.pdf  
Supporting evidence: DTI, 2003. 
Options for a low carbon future.  
http://webarchive.nationalarchives
.gov.uk/20070603164510/http://w
ww.dti.gov.uk/files/file14769.pdf  
2003 Royal Society Royal Society response to the House of Lords 
Science and Technology Committee Inquiry into 
‘How will the UK meet its greener energy targets’ 
http://royalsociety.org/uploadedFiles/Royal_Soci
ety_Content/policy/publications/2003/9770.pdf  
  
2005 House of 
Lords 
Economic Affairs Committee Hearing. 22 
February 2005. Questions 264-279 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200
506/ldselect/ldeconaf/12/5022206.htm 
Comments from Dieter Helm 
2005 House of 
Lords 
Economic Affairs Committee Hearing. 22 March 
2005. Questions 400-419 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200
506/ldselect/ldeconaf/12/5032201.htm 
Comments from Paul Ekins 
2007 Department 
of Trade and 
Industry 
Energy White Paper: Meeting the Energy 
Challenge 
 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/2012
1205174605/http:/www.decc.gov.uk/assets/decc
/publications/white_paper_07/file39387.pdf  
Supporting evidence: DTI, 2007. 
The UK MARKAL Energy Model in 
the 2007 Energy White Paper 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives
.gov.uk/+/http://www.berr.gov.uk/
files/file38979.pdf 
2007 Commission 
for Integrated 
Transport 
Transport and Climate Change 
http://www.cambridgeenergy.com/archive/2007
-02-08/commission-integ-trans.pdf 
 
  
2007 Department 
of Trade and 
Industry 
The Future of Nuclear Power. The Role of Nuclear 
Power in a Low Carbon UK Economy. 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/htt
p://www.berr.gov.uk/files/file39197.pdf  
 
  
2007 WWF Consultation on the draft Climate Change Bill: 
Response by WWF-UK 
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Year Organisation Title of document and web address Supporting model (MARKAL) 
resources / Further details 
http://assets.wwf.org.uk/downloads/climate_bill
_response.pdf  
2008 Committee on 
Climate 
Change 
Building a low carbon economy - the UK's 
contribution to tackling climate change 
http://archive.theccc.org.uk/aws3/TSO-
ClimateChange.pdf  
Supporting evidence: AEA, 2008. 
MARKAL-MED model runs of long 
term carbon reduction targets in 
the UK (Phase 1).  
http://archive.theccc.org.uk/aws3/
MARKAL-
MED%20model%20runs%20of%20l
ong%20term%20carbon%20reducti
on%20targets%20in%20the%20UK
%20-%20AEA%20-
%20Phase%201%20report.pdf 
AEA, 2008. MED model runs of long 
term reduction targets in the UK 
(Phase 2). 
http://archive.theccc.org.uk/aws3/
MARKAL-
MED%20model%20runs%20of%20l
ong%20term%20carbon%20reducti
on%20targets%20in%20the%20UK
%20-%20AEA%20-
%20Phase%202%20report.pdf    
2008 House of 
Commons 
Commons debates. 21 January 2008 : Column 
1638W 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm20
0708/cmhansrd/cm080121/text/80121w0032.ht
m#0801225000045   
 Question on the cost of solar 
electricity generation in the UK 
MARKAL-macro model 
2008 House of 
Commons 
Public Bill Committee. 26 February 2008. C249 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm20
0708/cmpublic/energy/080226/pm/80226s01.ht
m#08022679000034  
Comments from The Minister for 
Energy (Malcolm Wicks) 
2008 House of 
Lords 
Economic Affairs Committee. 6 May 2008. Q1-17 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200
708/ldselect/ldeconaf/195/8050602.htm  
Comments from Paul Ekins and Neil 
Strachan 
2008 ARUP LENS consultation response 
http://www.ofgem.gov.uk/Networks/Trans/Archi
ve/ElecTrans/LENS/Documents1/080611_ARUP_
Response_to_LENS_consultation.pdf  
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Year Organisation Title of document and web address Supporting model (MARKAL) 
resources / Further details 
2008 World 
Development 
Movement 
Adding capacity at Heathrow airport: 
Department of Transport Consultation 
http://www.wdm.org.uk/sites/default/files/heat
hrowconsultationresponse25022008.pdf  
  
2009 House of 
Commons 
Commons debates. 12 Jan 2009 : Column 118W 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm20
0809/cmhansrd/cm090112/text/90112w0026.ht
m  
 Question on the robustness of 
MARKAL and its use by different 
organisations 
2010 UK Energy 
Research 
Centre 
UKERC response to DECC 2050 Pathways 
Analysis: call for evidence  
http://www.ukerc.ac.uk/support/tiki-
download_file.php?fileId=1145  
  
2011 Committee on 
Climate 
Change 
The Fourth Carbon Budget. Reducing emissions 
thought the 2020s. 
http://archive.theccc.org.uk/aws2/4th%20Budge
t/CCC-4th-Budget-Book_plain_singles.pdf  
Supporting evidence: University 
College London, 2010. UK MARKAL 
Modelling – Examining 
Decarbonisation Pathways in the 
2020s on the Way to Meeting the 
2050 Emissions Target 
http://archive.theccc.org.uk/aws2/
4th%20Budget/CCC%20MARKAL%2
0Final%20Report%20-
%20UCL%20Nov10.pdf  
2011 Nuclear Free 
Local 
Authorities 
Secretariat 
Government consultation on overarching energy 
national policy statement (en-1) and for nuclear 
power generation (en-6) 
http://nfznsc.gn.apc.org/docs/consultations/NFL
A_NPS_Response_2011.pdf  
  
2011 Department 
of Energy and 
Climate 
Change 
Planning our electric future: a white paper for 
secure affordable and low-carbon electricity 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/syste
m/uploads/attachment_data/file/48129/2176-
emr-white-paper.pdf  
 
2011 Her Majesty’s 
Government 
The Carbon Plan: Delivering our low carbon 
future 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/syste
m/uploads/attachment_data/file/47613/3702-
the-carbon-plan-delivering-our-low-carbon-
future.pdf  
Supporting evidence: AEA, 
2011.Pathways to 2050 - Detailed 
analysis. MARKAL Model Review 
and Scenarios for DECC’s 4th 
Carbon Budget Evidence Base. 
 
https://www.gov.uk/government/u
ploads/system/uploads/attachmen
t_data/file/48073/2270-pathways-
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Year Organisation Title of document and web address Supporting model (MARKAL) 
resources / Further details 
to-2050-detailed-analyses.pdf  
2012 Friends of the 
Earth 
Written evidence from Friends of the Earth to the 
Energy and Climate Change - First Report.  
Draft Energy Bill: Pre-legislative Scrutiny 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm20
1213/cmselect/cmenergy/275/275we19.htm  
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Table A2 Examples of the underpinning evidence base: energy policy goals, specific problems and 
use of MARKAL 
 
Theme Document Page Illustrative Quotations 
Policy goals and 
ambitions 
Department of Trade and 
Industry. Our Energy Future 
- Creating a Low Carbon 
Economy, London: DTI; 
2003.  
6 Our country needs a new energy policy. Despite 
the improvements we have made over the last 
five years, today’s policy will not meet tomorrow’s 
challenges. We need to address the threat of 
climate change. We must deal with the 
implications of reduced UK oil, gas and coal 
production, which will make us a net energy 
importer instead of an energy exporter. And over 
the next twenty years or so we will need to 
replace or update much of our energy 
infrastructure. 
Policy goals and 
ambitions 
Department of Trade and 
Industry. Our Energy Future 
- Creating a Low Carbon 
Economy, London: DTI; 
2003.  
6 The opportunity to shift the UK decisively towards 
becoming a low carbon economy where higher 
resource productivity - producing more with 
fewer natural resources and less pollution - will 
contribute to higher living standards and a better 
quality of life. 
Policy goals and 
ambitions 
Department of Trade and 
Industry. Our Energy Future 
- Creating a Low Carbon 
Economy, London: DTI; 
2003.  
6 [The new energy policy] reflects, and will 
reinforce, our wider commitment to sustainable 
development 
Policy goals and 
ambitions 
Department of Trade and 
Industry. Our Energy Future 
- Creating a Low Carbon 
Economy, London: DTI; 
2003. 
11 … to put ourselves on a path to cut the UK’s 
carbon dioxide emissions - the main contributor 
to global warming - by some 60% by about 2050, 
as recommended by the RCEP, with real progress 
by 2020 
Policy goals and 
ambitions 
Department of Trade and 
Industry. Our Energy Future 
- Creating a Low Carbon 
Economy, London: DTI; 
2003. 
11 … to maintain the reliability of energy supplies 
Policy goals and 
ambitions 
Department of Trade and 
Industry. Our Energy Future 
- Creating a Low Carbon 
Economy, London: DTI; 
2003. 
11 … to promote competitive markets in the UK and 
beyond, helping to raise the rate of sustainable 
economic growth and to improve our 
productivity; and 
Policy goals and 
ambitions 
Department of Trade and 
Industry. Our Energy Future 
- Creating a Low Carbon 
11 … to ensure that every home is adequately and 
affordably heated. 
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Theme Document Page Illustrative Quotations 
Economy, London: DTI; 
2003. 
Policy goals and 
ambitions 
Department of Trade and 
Industry. Our Energy Future 
- Creating a Low Carbon 
Economy, London: DTI; 
2003. 
11 We do not propose to set targets for the share of 
total energy or electricity supply to be met from 
different fuels. We do not believe Government is 
equipped to decide the composition of the fuel 
mix. 
Policy goals and 
ambitions 
Great Britain, House of 
Lords. Select Committee on 
Economic Affairs. The 
Economics of Renewable 
Energy. Volume II: Evidence. 
HL (2007-08, 195-II); 2008. 
 
Qu. 3 Professor Ekins: The key considerations for UK 
energy policy I think were outlined in both the 
White Papers which the Government has 
produced over the last five or so years: the 
reduction in carbon emissions, energy security, 
competitive markets and/or competitiveness 
(depending on how you want to interpret that 
particular third objective), and something to do 
with affordability which might or might not be 
expressed in terms of fuel poverty. The balance to 
be accorded to those four objectives is of course a 
political matter. My reading of the situation at the 
moment is that the Government is giving most 
attention to the reduction of carbon emissions, 
but energy security is coming up fast on the inside 
track and may indeed overtake it at some point. I 
think that the concern about competitive markets 
and competitiveness is always with us, so to 
speak, and some commentators think that the 
objective of fuel poverty—specifically its effective 
abolition by 2016—has lost ground somewhat 
against the other objectives. That is how I would 
characterise the objectives. 
Policy goals and 
ambitions 
Great Britain, House of 
Lords. Select Committee on 
Economic Affairs. The 
Economics of Renewable 
Energy. Volume II: Evidence. 
HL (2007-08, 195-II); 2008. 
 
Qu. 4 Lord Lawson: I would like to follow up that 
question of cost and system integration. I was 
very interested, Professor Ekins, in your saying 
that you think that energy security is coming to 
the forefront; I think you are probably right. 
Image of the 
policy problem 
Department of Trade and 
Industry. Meeting the 
energy challenge, London: 
DTI; 2007 
6 We face two long-term energy challenges: 
tackling climate change by reducing carbon 
dioxide emissions both within the UK and abroad; 
and ensuring secure, clean and affordable energy 
as we become increasingly dependent on 
imported fuel. 
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Theme Document Page Illustrative Quotations 
Image of the 
policy problem 
Department of Trade and 
Industry. Meeting the 
energy challenge, London: 
DTI; 2007 
7 At home it is likely that the UK will need around 
30-35GW of new electricity generation capacity 
over the next two decades and around two thirds 
of this capacity by 2020. This is because many of 
our coal and most of our existing nuclear power 
stations are set to close. And energy demand will 
grow over time, despite increased energy 
efficiency, as the economy expands. 
Image of the 
policy problem 
Department of Trade and 
Industry. Meeting the 
energy challenge, London: 
DTI; 2007 
9 The starting point for our energy policy is to save 
energy. 
Image of the 
policy problem 
Department of Trade and 
Industry. Meeting the 
energy challenge, London: 
DTI; 2007 
4 We need to tackle climate change and energy 
security together. 
Image of the 
policy problem 
Department of Trade and 
Industry. Meeting the 
energy challenge, London: 
DTI; 2007 
5 Our aim will be to ensure that companies have a 
wide range of low carbon options available so we 
can retain a diverse energy mix, which is good for 
our security of supply, and will help us to become 
a low carbon economy 
Use of MARKAL Department of Trade and 
Industry. Our Energy Future 
- Creating a Low Carbon 
Economy, London: DTI; 
2003. 
17 A broad vision of the energy system of 2020 is 
described below. This is a scenario. It draws on 
several sources, including modelling work for the 
white paper, the DTI’s Foresight programme and 
other scenarios. 
Use of MARKAL Department of Trade and 
Industry. Our Energy Future 
- Creating a Low Carbon 
Economy, London: DTI; 
2003. 
20 This white paper is based on a large amount of 
analysis and modelling. We are publishing 
separately documents which form part of that 
work, on estimates of the cost and potential for 
various long-term low carbon options; on the 
background outlook for energy demand and 
emissions between 2000 and 2050; an initial 
assessment of the impact of the policies as set out 
in this white paper; and background calculations 
to achieving carbon cuts of between 15-25 million 
tonnes of carbon in 2020.11 
Use of MARKAL Department of Trade and 
Industry. Our Energy Future 
- Creating a Low Carbon 
Economy, London: DTI; 
2003. 
28 A wide range of analytical work has supported the 
white paper. This included work by the 
Government’s interdepartmental analysts group 
on long-term reductions in greenhouse gas 
emissions, following which the DTI commissioned 
Future Energy Solutions to use the MARKAL 
modelling approach to look at the costs and 
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Theme Document Page Illustrative Quotations 
options for a substantial CO2 reduction by 2050. 
21 
Use of MARKAL Department of Trade and 
Industry. Our Energy Future 
- Creating a Low Carbon 
Economy, London: DTI; 
2003. 
28 The analysis suggests that for many of the 
assumptions tested the cost of reducing CO2 
emissions by 60% by 2050 was in the range £200-
300 per tonne of carbon. GDP in 2050 was 
reduced by 0.5-2.0%, equivalent to an average 
annual reduction of between 0.01 and 0.02 
percentage points from a business as usual GDP 
growth rate of 2.25% per annum. 
Use of MARKAL Department of Trade and 
Industry. Our Energy Future 
- Creating a Low Carbon 
Economy, London: DTI; 
2003. 
28 Higher costs were indicated if innovation in low-
carbon technologies was limited, if energy 
efficiency improved only in line with past trends, 
or if both new nuclear build and carbon capture 
and storage were completely excluded in the 
longer term. 
Use of MARKAL Department of Trade and 
Industry. Our Energy Future 
- Creating a Low Carbon 
Economy, London: DTI; 
2003. 
28 To be on track for the 15-25 MtC reduction 
beyond current baselines that we are aiming at, 
MARKAL indicates costs of reducing carbon in 
2020 in the range £10-80 per tonne of carbon. 
Use of MARKAL Department of Trade and 
Industry. Options for a low 
carbon future. DTI 
Economics Paper No. 4, 
United Kingdom; 2003. 
155 Comparison of the overall costs with and without 
the constraint gives us information on the costs of 
meeting the constraint. 
 
 
 
